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Human Rights and Bioethics:
Formulating a Universal Right to
Health, Health Care, or Health
Protection?
George P. Smith, It
ABSTRACT
Codifying, and then implementing, an international right to
health, health care, or protection is beset with serious roadblocks-
foremost among them being contentious issues of indeterminacy,
justiciability, and progressive realization.
Although advanced-and to some degree recognized under the
rubric of a social or cultural entitlement within the law of human
rights and, more particularly, the U.S. Declaration on Human
Rights, together with International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human
Rights, and presently UNESCO's Draft Declaration on Universal
Norms on Bioethics-attainment of such a universal right to
health remains at best dubious.
The central impediment to the recognition of such a right is
determining the extent to which a sustained level of economic
stability must be charted before a state can be seen as either
recognizing or enforcing a right to health of any kind and at any
level of magnitude. Indeed, under the ICESCR, realization of
economic social and cultural rights is to be effected only under a
standard of progressivity. In other words, so long a states move
"progressively" toward the realization of these rights, no actionable
violations will be sustained. This, then, results in a flawed
enforcement mechanism which allows any state signatory to this
foundational covenant to pace enforcement of the rights under the
ICESCR according to national standards of political will and
* Professor of Law, School of Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington,
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Some of the ideas in this essay had their genesis in my book, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
BIOMEDICINE (2000).
I am indebted to my colleague, Rett R. Ludwikowski, for reviewing an earlier draft
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differing levels of economic development and sustainability.
Economic self-interest-not transnational principles and lofty
aspirational goals-will determine ultimately, the extent to which
health care protections are recognized as a integral part of social,
cultural, political, or human rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
While the modern law of human rights may have a short, formative
period of no more than three centuries, the dignity of man and his
common citizenship in society has existed for thousands of years.
Indeed, almost from the very beginning of recorded humanity, the quest
for a validation of human rights has not been so concerned with reason,
but with an instinctive feeling of what is both right and good.1 Thus, it
has been said, "Human rights have always existed with the human
being;"'2 such is the concept of human dignity.3
1. Fali S. Nariman, The Universality of Human Rights, 50 REV. INT'L
COMMISSION JURISTS 8, 11 (1993).
2. Id. at 17 (quoting Japanese Judge Tanaka, a member of the International
Court of Justice that wrote many famous Judgments about Apartheid).
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BIOETHICS
Under one interpretation, human rights are seen as "non-
positivistic, principled, legal limits to what states, state actors, and state
agents can do to their citizens."4 As such, human rights impose no
obligations on states themselves; rather, they impose limits on state
action.5 This U.S. view is drawn from the philosophy of the Bill of
Rights and rooted in a neo-Lockean conception of the rule of law as a
"commitment to a determinate set of legal rules. ' '6 In the international
human rights community, however, a contrary view is taken-a view
which holds to the notion that these rights either obligate state action
under certain circumstances or, alternatively, obligate restraint by the
state.
7
Although a concrete notion of human rights appears absent from
the Greek and Roman legal systems as well as the Chinese and other
ancient civilizations,8 certain claims to parental authorship have, over
time, been tied to the Magna Carta of 1215, the Bill of Rights of 1689,
the American Declaration of Independence in 1776, and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789.9 Yet, from
the standpoint of historical accuracy, the French Declaration is seen
correctly as the first document of its character to reference contemporary
social, economic, and cultural rights styled originally as the rights to
education, work, property ownership, and social protection.1 0
Although viewed as a type of generalized philosophical manifesto for
the western world, the French Declaration was not embraced by
3. Avery Dulles, Human Rights: Papal Teaching and the United Nations, 179
AM. 14 (1995); see generally, H.C. PAYNE, ETERNAL CRUCIBLE: A NEW COSMOLOGY
(1974).
4. Robin West, Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and American
Constitutionalism, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS, INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 93,
93 (Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Adrienne Stone eds., 2003).
5. Id. at 93.
6. Id. at 95.
7. Id. at 93.
8. See Michael D. Kirby, The Right to Health Fifty Years On: Still Skeptical?, 4
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 7, 8 (1999) (citing to Isaiah Berlin for support).
9. Id. at 8. See generally, Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the luis Commune, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 297 (1999).
10. Kirby, supra note 8, at 8; see PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN (1998); Stephen P. Marks, From the
"Single Confused Page" to the "Decalogue for Six Billion Persons" The Roots of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the French Revolution, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 459,
472 (1998) (supporting the view of the French Declaration as a unique starting point
with respect to the notion of human rights). But see Hugo Adam Bedau, 'Anarchical
Fallacies" Bentham's Attack on Human Rights, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 261 (2000) (discussing
Bentham's destructive criticism of the French Declaration and his implied criticism of
any possible doctrine of human rights).
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subsequent European constitutions.1 ' Indeed, these new constitutions
were seen not only as less pragmatic than the French Declaration, but
the new European constitutions also were prone to deemphasize "the
philosophy of inalienable rights."'1 2 Rights were, thus, constitutional in
origin. In the United States, however, rights were held not to be societal
"gift[s]," but natural or inherent. 13
The European constitutions of the nineteenth century were the
frameworks or mechanisms for declaring rights to be constitutionally
protected within legal boundaries.' 4 Thus, it was solely within the
legislative power where fundamental rights were not only declared but
limited. 15  Latin American constitutionalism de-emphasized the
"inalienability" of rights and, instead, during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, chose to reference only those laws established by
state authorities.' 6
In attempting to distinguish human rights from fundamental
constitutional rights, socialist jurisprudence sought to ignore any
inherent or natural rights theories and treated them as but philosophical
rights; still, socialist jurisprudence recognized the constitutionally
created rights as political in origin.17 Even though constitutions drafted
during the post-socialist period failed to follow the socialist concept of
granted rights, there remained a dilemma: how to develop a "middle-
ground approach" that would validate the idea that "a consensus reached
by the people at the constitution's adoption is the result of their
recognition of some commonly accepted values. 118 It was all too
apparent to those drafting new constitutions that securing fundamental
recognition of a selection of core rights was not guaranteed by a
designation of these rights as "natural."' 9 Indeed, throughout the
subsequent history of human rights, cultural relavitism has been a
dominant force with which to reckon, for the values of some people are
not always capable of being judged by the norms shared by others.20
Even with the vagueness and imprecision that characterizes
contemporary human rights, there is a trend toward the
11. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Post-Soviet
States and Latin America: A Comparative Analysis, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 20
(2004).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 20-21. See generally JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
PARLIAMENT, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 1 (1999) (discussing how the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, long regarded as the most "fundamental element of the
British Constitution," has recently been challenged by judges and academic lawyers in
the United Kingdom).
16. Ludwikowski, supra note 11, at 21.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 22.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 23.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BIOETHICS
"internationalization of human rights movements. '21 Yet, such a trend
by no means can be seen as an integration of internationalized human
rights with international human rights movements. Rather, it must be
accepted as but a "toleration for human rights monitoring by
governmental and non-governmental organizations and accession to the
most important human rights treaties.
22
II. SEEKING A CONSENSUS
The need for a modern consensus on the universality of human
rights, their international declaration, recognition, and protection, arose
as a consequence of the ravages of World War II. The Axis Powers'
savage trampling of human rights, the holocausts of the gas chambers of
Auschwitz and Dachau, and the use of the atom bomb on Hiroshima
galvanized an international response to universalize a legal process for
protecting human rights: the United Nations' adoption in 1948 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 23 While the 1945 Charter of
the United Nations re-affirmed "faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women," it was rather vague in encouraging respect for human
rights.24 This deficiency was corrected on December 10, 1948, when the
U.N. General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration and, at least
on paper, established the "universalization of basic human rights."25
The Organization of American States' action, also in 1948, in
issuing the American Declaration of The Rights and Duties of Man,26
complemented the Universal Declaration. Together, both documents
became the bulwark for recognizing "internationally" human rights and
fundamental freedoms. They are also seen as the source for other
conventions which further defined and elaborated the rights stated
originally within these two instruments-the most significant being the
21. Id. at 40.
22. Id. at 41-42.
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. DOC A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
24. Nariman, supra note 1, at 12.
25. Id. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1153 (1998) (describing the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 as the "single most important reference point for
cross-cultural discussion of human freedom and dignity in the world today").
26. Ninth International Conference of American States, American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. No. XXX; see also HENRY J.
STEIMER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, LAWS,
POLITICS, MORALS 642 (1996) (discussing the process of drafting an Inter-American
treaty, which resulted in the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969, "which
contains 26 rights and freedoms, 21 of which are formulated in similar terms to the
provisions of' the ICCPR).
12992005]
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1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)2 7 and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).28
Article 1 of the 1945 United Nations Charter affirms the dignity and
worth of the human person as the cornerstone of human rights. This
precept is buttressed by the Universal Declaration in Article 22 where
economic, social, and cultural rights are recognized as "indispensable for
[a person's] dignity and the free development of his personality."29 Thus,
autonomy-and its exercise-is central to the recognition and
implementation of the very goal of maintaining human rights. Indeed,
"the free and full development"3 0 of personality in the community can
never be achieved, as Article 29 of the Universal Declaration sets out,
unless one is seen as an autonomous individual.
Interestingly, while the Universal Declaration has no force as a
binding treaty, it has nonetheless encouraged "a culture of human
rights" and thereby served as a framework for expanding and recreating
the very boundaries of human rights by means of a "vast array of
nongovernmental organizations and civil-society bodies committed, in
very practical ways, to upholding universal rights at home and
abroad."31
The purpose of this essay is to explore the extent to which a
universal right to health, health care, or health protection is being
shaped and, to some degree and level, recognized under the rubric of a
social or cultural entitlement within the law of human rights. The
conclusion to be reached is that current issues of indeterminancy,
justiciability, and progressive realization present serious roadblocks to
the goal of codifying and implementing an international right to health.
27. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 933 U.N.T.S. 3 (the United States is not a party).
28. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (the United States is a party, subject to several reservations,
understandings and declarations); see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A.
Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25/Annex (Dec. 12, 1989); Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, G.A. Res.
39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1989); Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180
(Dec. 18, 1979); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965). See generally
DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
RECONSIDERED (1990) (espousing the view that the whole international law of human
rights is viewed as having developed essentially by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man); Dinah Shelton,
Challenges to the Future of Civil & Political Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 669 (1998).
29. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23, art. 22.
30. Id. art. 29.
31. Kirby, supra note 8, at 16; see also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 26, at
563-9 (exploring the regional approach to the promotion and protection of human
rights). See generally 1 MILTON I. ROEMER, NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD
(1991).
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While measured progress in meeting these first two challenges is
occurring, the most contentious impediment remains: determining the
extent to which a sustained level of economic stability must be attained
before a state can seek to recognize and enforce a right to health at any
minimum or maximum level. Stated otherwise, economic self-interest
must be recognized as the primary vector of force gauging the extent to
which a state will honor the enforcement of a human right to health,
healthcare, or health protection.
III. APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Issues of Justiciability and Indeterminancy
The international law of human rights is shaped initially by states
assuming obligations in various international instruments. While these
documents reference individual rights in every instance, a state's
obligation and the rights of individuals neither correlate nor necessarily
exist in the same legal order. Because of this reality of international
lawmaking, three perspectives have developed-and are used
alternatively as dictated by the particular circumstances-to evaluate
the integrity of international human rights agreements.
Under the first perspective, human rights are viewed essentially, if
not exclusively, as interstate matters. Accordingly, international human
rights create two sets of duties: the duty of every state-party to act as it
promised and the corresponding right of the other state-party to have
the original promise kept. An individual has no international legal
rights nor remedies in the international legal order and is but an
"incidental beneficiary" of rights and duties between the state-parties.3 2
Some interpret justiciability as a principle that allows a judicial
body to address complaints alleging violations of a legal right while
others expand the meaning to include the "possibility" to be heard before
a tribunal. One such tribunal is, for example, what was formerly the
European Commission on Human Rights, 33 but has been replaced by a
newly constituted European Court of Human Rights.3 4 Defined broadly
32. Louis Henkin, The Philosophy of Human Rights, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 137-38 (Milton E. Winston ed., 1989). See generally, ANTONIO CASSESE,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD (1994).
33. BRIDGET C.A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (1999).
34. See Europ. T.S. No. 155 (Protocol 11 amended the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Europ. T.S. No. 005, and
came into effect November 1, 1998). Id. It directs all state parties to accept a complete
overhaul of the Convention control mechanisms with the creation of a single Court of
Human Rights replacing, as such, The European Commission and Court. Id. It is hoped
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as "the susceptability of a right to third-party adjudication," 35
justiciability varies in scope and application from one decision-making
body to another-all because of the heretofore lack of uniformity or
consistency in global judicial decision-making. 36
A move toward consistency was taken in 1998 when the Eleventh
Additional Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms entered into force.37 Prior to
this Protocol, under the European Commission on Human Rights, the
only mandatory procedure required of states was adherence to the
interstate complaints procedure of the European Commission of Human
Rights and the Committee of Ministers-at the time, the highest
political body in the Council of Europe. 38 Since individual complaints
procedure and jurisdiction before the European Court of Human Rights
were wholly optional, the parties thus had the option of recognizing them
through voluntary declarations and usually only for a limited period. 39
Under the newly established permanent European Court of Human
Rights, optional claims were eliminated.40 This change had the direct
effect of requiring individual complaints and interstate complaint
procedures by all state parties to be brought before an independent
court.41 In turn, the Commission of Ministers is now eliminated from
the decision-making processes and charged with the responsibility of
supervising the execution of the Court's judgments at the national
level. 42
that with time and implementation this Protocol will go far in clarifying issues of
justiciability.
35. TOEBES, supra note 33, at 168.
36. See id. at 169; Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should there be an International Complaints
Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 462, 473-74 (2004). Others view justiciability as a concept referring primarily
to what is permissible in a state's domestic law or as tied to the issue of what rights (or
disputes about them) are recognized, and thus justiciable in a mechanism capable of
adjudicating them. Id. When mechanisms or procedures are found lacking, disputes are
seen as nonjusticiable. Id. And, interestingly, no provision is made by the majority of
states for domestic adjudiciation of economic, social and cultural rights. Id.; see also
HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW DIMENSIONS AND CHALLENGES 135-39 (Janusz Symonides ed.,
1998) (discussing the issue of justiciability with respect to the right to a healthy
environment); Brigit Toebes, Towards an Improved Understanding of The International
Human Right to Health, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 661, 671 (1999) (stating that the lack of
judicial review of the right to health has resulted on a number of attempts to introduce
health issues through other international procedures, both at the regional and national
levels).
37. See Europ. T.S. No. 155, supra note 34.
38. See MANFRED NOwAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
REGIME 161 (2003).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 164-65.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Largely divested of political influence, the streamlined and
accelerated system has seen an increase in individual complaints.
43
Indeed, in the five years since 1998 and Protocol 11's entering into force,
roughly 135,000 applications have been lodged. 44 This figure is higher
than the total of all such applications submitted in the previous forty
years. 45
Although mandatory since the establishment of European
Commission on Human Rights, interstate complaint procedures against
other states for human rights violations have rarely been pursued.
46
Interestingly, only twelve interstate complaints were filed in the fifty-
year history of the European Commission on Human Rights.
47
Under a second view of human rights, international human rights
agreements not only create rights and duties for party-states, but they
confer upon the individual rights against the state under international
law, in addition to rights ensuring the individual's benefit under
national constitutional legal systems. Even though enforceable only by
interstate remedies or by governments or international bodies acting in
the individual's behalf, the individual does have international legal
rights under this view.48 A good example of this perspective in action
may be seen in the British 1998 Human Rights Act, which implements
the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights in English domestic
law.49 While failing to incorporate the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law, the Act allows the Convention to be relied
upon directly in British domestic courts. Indeed, under so-called
"Convention rights," certain provisions of the Convention and some of its
protocols are given a defined status in English law.50 The European
43. Id. at 164.
44. Id. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION,
MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT (Janusz Symonides ed., 2003).
45. Nowak, supra note 38, at 164.
46. Id. at 165.
47. Id. at 166. See generally ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, HOW TO COMPLAIN TO THE U.N.
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM (2003).
48. See generally Henkin, supra note 32.
49. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered
into force on Sept. 3, 1953).
50. K. D. Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy, 62
MOD. L. REV. 79, 82 (1999); see Richard A. Edwards, Deference under the Human Rights
Act, 65 MOD. L. REV. 859, 860 (2002) (observing that while the extent of judicial
deference to the other branches of government is under current debate, it nonetheless is
a firmly established feature of judicial review in cases involving the British Human
Rights Act); see also Paul Craig, The Courts, the Human Rights Act and Judicial
Review, 117 LAW Q. REV. 589 (2000) (discussing how recent case law in England has
clarified important issues of principle concerning the interpretation of the Human
Rights Act 1998). See generally K. D. Ewing, The Case for Social Rights, in PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS, INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 323 (noting how the
recent enactment of the convention in the HRA has effected the role of the judiciary in
13032005]
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Convention on Human Rights guarantees a number of rights without
limit or restriction. 51 Thus, when a citizen's rights and freedoms are
violated under Article 13 of the Convention, the citizen is given an
effective remedy before a national authority.
52
Finally, a third perspective on human rights advocates privatization
theory and argues that party-states have legislated "human rights" into
international law, thus conferring upon those rights the status of
affirmative independent values. 53 This view is advanced as a basis for
acknowledging a right to health to be incorporated fully, both in
principle and in operation, as part of a domestic national legal system.
Such an incorporation would thereby create a public obligation on
national governments to implement that right and to structure a private
legal remedy for its enforcement in their domestic courts, administrative
tribunals, and other public authorities.54
Multiple international investigative or settlement bodies complicate
the issue of justiciability. For example, the ICESCR designates the
England). See generally Alasdour Maclean, The Human Rights Act of 1998 and the
Individual's Right to Treatment, 4 MED. L. INT'L 245 (2000).
51. Ewing, supra note 50, at 82.
the right to life (article 2), the right not to suffer torture or inhuman degrading
treatment (article 3), the right not to be held in servitude (article 4), the right to
liberty (article 5), the right to a fair trial (article 6), protection against the
retrospective application of the criminal law (article 7), the right to protection of
private life (article 8), rights to freedom of conscience and religion (article 9),
expression (article 10), and association and peaceful assembly (article 11), and the
right to marry and found a family (article 12).
Some of these rights are, to be sure, qualified: among them being those relating to
privacy, conscience and religion, expression, and association and assembly. Id.
52. Id. See generally, Mark Elliott, The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty?
The Implications for Justifying Judicial Review, 11 LAW Q. REV. 119 passim (1998).
53. See Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, Feb. 9,
2005, art. 14 (ii-iv), 22(b), SHS/EST/CIB-EXTR/05/CONF. 202/2. See generally ANDREW
CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993) (challenging the presumption
that the fundamental rights and freedoms of the European Convention on Human
Rights are irrelevant in the private sphere).
54. Philip W. Bates, Health Law, Ethics and Policy: Challenges and New
Avenues for the 21st Century and New Millenium, 18 MED. L. 13, 21 (1999); see
FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, CHALLENGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, USING
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS at xvi (2001) (illustrating "how and in what areas
international human rights law can enhance U.S. civil rights and liberties protections");
BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN
U.S. COURTS (1996) (examining the development of human rights litigation in the U.S.
against foreign officials and governments who have committed torture against private
citizens, thereby violating international law); Richard B. Lillich, Damages for Gross
Violations of International Human Rights, Awarded by U.S. Courts, 15 HUM. RTS. Q.
207 (1993) (discussing the issue of choice of law with respect to the determination of a
defendant's liability and the amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff in a
human rights violation case); see also TIMOTHY S. JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS
FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 24-30
(2003) (discussing the extent to which, in America, there is a constitutional right to
health).
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BIOETHICS
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Commission on Human
Rights, and particular specialized agencies-International Labor
Organization; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO); Food and Agricultural Agency; and the World
Health Organization (WHO)-as oversight bodies for individual human
rights complaints. 55 When the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is brought into play on the issue of
individual complaints, 56 the determination of issues of justiciability
becomes even more clouded. Additionally, to some extent, economic,
social, and cultural rights claims are also subject to review under their
respective treaties by the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 57
Current efforts by a newly structured working group of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights are tackling this very contentious issue of
whether a new complaints mechanism can codify all those economic,
social, and cultural human rights-together with civil and political
rights-under one individual complaints procedure. 58 It is argued that
since all human rights are universal and interdependent, they should be
enforced uniformly under one mechanism. 59
Critics have expressed skepticism as to whether such a mechanism
is practical and Utopian since the ICESCR never intended the rights and
obligations contained in it "to be susceptible to judicial or quasi-judicial
determination."60 Indeed, the drafters of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR "well understood the
differences between economic, social and cultural rights, on the one
hand, and civil and political rights, on the other."'61
Prevailing authority holds that violations of both social and cultural
rights generally, and violations of the right to health in particular, are
not justiciable and thus unsuitable as bases for judicial review because of
their very indeterminancy. 62 Put simply, since the United Nations
provides no specific procedures for complaints for violations of health
rights, as well as other economic, social and cultural rights, violations of
these rights are not justiciable. 63
To shape access to health care resources and advance the ultimate
aspirational goal of a legal claim to a right to health, a "right to health"
55. Dennis & Stewart, supra note 36, at 506.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 504.
58. Id. at 462.
59. Id. at 463.
60. Id. at 515.
61. Id.
62. TOEBES, supra note 33, at 169.
63. Id. at 181.
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must be precisely defined. Article 3 of the European Convention of
Human Rights mandates only equitable access to health care of
appropriate quality. 64 Of course, this does not mandate what form of
health care is accessible or appropriate. Indeterminancy, thus, is a
serious central weakness to stabilizing the right to access to health care
and is coupled with the realization that there is neither a moral nor legal
standard that gives universal meaning to a "right to health. '65
B. Non-Treaty Bases for Implementing Human Rights
Traditional support for formulating a general, non-treaty based
international law of human rights is found in customary law, authentic
interpretation, and general principles. 66 Customary international law is
seen as supplying a comprehensive set of norms held applicable to all
states. Indeed, it has been maintained that the range of rights
enumerated in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights should now be
seen as accommodating all of the desired human rights principles.6 7
Others contend that the ICESCR and ICCPR,68 have shaped the
customary acceptance of some sixteen groups of human rights found in
the covenants themselves. 69 In the past, customary law was developed
through the emergence of practice joined by a sense of legal obligation or
opinio iuris. Today, however, there is a movement from empirical or
inductive verification to interpretative verification. Accordingly, the text
of a U.N. declaration or treaty provision is tested to determine whether
the normative claims set forth in it are being upheld by conduct. 70
Inasmuch as the rules and principles built upon the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights are recognized as authoritative
interpretations of the U.N. Charter obligations of Articles 55 and 56, all
member states are bound to conform their treaty obligations and
64. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human
Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, art. 3, Eur. T.S. No. 164, 36 I.L.M. 817 (1997)
[hereinafter Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine].
65. David P. Fidler, "Geographical Morality" Revisited: International Relations,
International Law and the Controversy over Placebo-Controlled HIV Clinical Trials in
Developing Countries, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 299, 348 (2001); see also Benjamin Mason
Meier, Breathing Life into the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Smoking
Cessation and the Right to Health, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y & ETHICS 137, 156 (2005)
(arguing that health care is a necessary component of a right to health).
66. R.J. VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 48-51
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1986).
67. Id. at 38.
68. See generally, FORSYTHE, supra note 28.
69. Rolf KiInnemann, A Coherent Approach to Human Rights, 17 HUM. RTS. Q.
323, 324-25 (1995).
70. VINCENT, supra note 66, at 37-39.
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practice with relevant organizations of the U.N. in ways that promote of
human rights. 71
Using the general principles of domestic law recognized and
developed by civilized nations which are then transferred to the
international plane and applied to relations between states provides yet
another anchor for human rights obligations through rules of jus
cogens.
72
A final source for validation of international human rights, regarded
by some as the most important part of contemporary lawmaking, is
referred to as the "soft law" of human rights.7 3 This term includes
policies and mechanisms for standard-setting designed as either a final
or intermediate consensus; it is through the process of standard-setting
and monitoring where most political action occurs. 74
C. Limits of Practical Applicability
The general rules of international law may be seen as failing to
establish an individual right of action before a domestic court, unless
domestic law provides specifically for such a right.7 5 Although this lack
of standing is a debilitating weakness in enforcing human rights and
setting penalties for their breach, perhaps the central roadblock to
effective action is the U.N. Security Council's enforcement lethargy.
Thus, in addition to recognizing a right of protection for human rights,
an "obligation to intervene" for humanitarian purposes must be imposed
as well. 76
Presently, the voluntary system of compliance and self-policing
efforts by individual states, coupled with the Security Council's lack of
decisiveness, guarantees that the self-interests of each state will shape
and control its ultimate response to a human rights violation. Coupled
with the passivity of the Security Council is the lack of jurisdictional
authority by the International Court of Justice to deal with serious
human rights infractions.
Another inherent weakness is the absence of a general system of
ethics under the very concept of human rights. To achieve a system of
this nature, structures would have to be designed in such a way as to
impose far-reaching obligations on the individual to other individuals.
71. Id. at 44.
72. Id. at 46-47.
73. Id. at 45-46.
74. Id.
75. Bruno Simma, International Human Rights and General International Law:
A Comparative Analysis, in IV-2 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN
LAW: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 153, 231 (Academy of European
Law ed., 1995).
76. Id. at 232.
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Such structures would be alien to the classical nature of international
law. State obligations are established under the concept of human
rights, with no inclusion of individual duties to other human beings. The
demand made in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
that all beings "should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood" 77 is far too broad to be seen as a visible mechanism for
imposing concrete duties. "The fact that human rights create individual
rights but not individual duties"7 8 is quite rational because "the function
of human rights is to create State obligations, and not to create general
ethics. They are minimum standards for acceptable governance and a
means of empowerment against oppression by States. '79
In the final analysis, it appears as though contentious debate will
nonetheless continue to focus on whether economic, social, and cultural
rights are as pressing as civil and political rights.80 Some would seek to
prioritize rights, arguing that there are varying moral weights attached
to them. Others contend that no ranking can be made of fundamental
rights and, indeed, none should be honored before others.8 1 Seeking
universality in application of human rights requires all states to respect
a defined set or core of minimum standards of behavior. So long as they
meet these standards, adjustments might allow for differing legal, moral,
and cultural value systems within each state.8 2
IV. SPECIFIC PROTECTIONS FOR HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY
In November 1996, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention
for The Protection of Human Rights and the Dignity of the Human Being
with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on
Human Rights and Bioethics.8 3 Patterned after the human rights
approach of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950,84 the Bioethics Convention
seeks to establish a direct relationship between bioethics and human
rights. While the European Convention uses a holistic personality-
identity framework for focusing on the value of the human being and the
dignity and value of humanhood, the Bioethics Convention endeavors to
77. Kuinneman, supra note 69, at 339.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Helena M. Cook, International Human Rights Mechanisms, 50 REV. INT'L
COMMISSION JURISTS 31, 38 (1993).
81. Id. at 38.
82. Id. at 40; see also LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & ZITA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE AIDS PANDEMIc 29 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997).
83. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 65.
84. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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enlarge and build upon this concept of respect, dignity, and protection
and seeks to apply it to human substances as well, thereby safeguarding
genetic heritage.8 5
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine is similar to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its aspirational goal to
recognize "the importance of insuring the dignity of the human being"; in
its Preamble and Declaration in Article 1, the Convention states that
that the parties "shall protect the dignity and identity of all human
beings."8 6 Yet in the Convention's Explanatory, emphasis is placed on
the conclusion that the essential value to be upheld and used to interpret
the Convention is the protection of human rights and dignity "with the
principle of respect for human dignity being central to Articles 15
(regarding scientific research), 17 (safeguarding the protection of those
unable to consent to research upon them), and 21 (prohibiting the
commercialization of human genes and human reproductive cloning).87
On the issue of human cloning, the draft Protocol to the Convention
clearly identifies the need to be guided by the understanding that "the
instrumentalisation of human beings" is contrary to human dignity.
88
Also, Article 1 suggests that the concept of human dignity may be used
to protect those nascent human life forms which are not yet eligible for
protection under a human rights analysis. 89
Although this Convention is primarily for European Community
members, countries who have observer status in the Council of Europe
and acted as participants in the Convention's preparation, such as the
United States, are invited to become signatories. In research involving
human subjects, the level of similarity between Convention and U.S.
federal precepts (e.g., principles of autonomy, beneficence, and justice) is
85. Eibe Riedel, Global Responsibilities and Bioethics: Reflections on the Council
of Europe's Bioethics Convention, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDS. 179, 182 (1997).
86. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 65, pmbl., art. 1.
87. Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, 9, Eur. T.S. No. 164, 36 I.L.M. 817 (Dec. 17, 1996).
88. Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity, Human Rights and
Human Genetics, 61 MOD. L. REV. 661, 663-64 (1998). Inasmuch as the original
Biomedicine Convention contained no direct ban on human cloning, a protocol to this
effect was drafted prohibiting "any intervention seeking to create a human being
genetically identical to another human being, whether living or dead." Additional
Protocol to the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human
Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of
Cloning Human Beings, art. 1, Eur. T.S. No. 168 (Jan. 12, 1998).
89. Beyleveld & Brownsword, supra note 88, at 664; see also Maurice A.M. de
Wachter, The European Convention on Bioethics, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13, 19
(1997).
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truly fascinating. 90  This fact, in turn, supports the point that
contemporary norms for global, bioethical decision-making are beginning
to take shape and achieve recognition under the very dynamic concept of
transnational human rights.
A. The UNESCO Declaration
When evaluating UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights,91 the concept of human dignity is seen as
the lynchpin of the Declaration itself. Indeed, of the twenty-five articles
compromising the document, the first four are set under the heading,
"Human Dignity and the Human Genome.' ' 92 Article 2 affirms: "(a)
Everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights
regardless of their genetic characteristics. (b) That dignity makes it
imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic
characteristics .. ..93
Following through with the need to maintain the human genome in
its natural state and prevent its commercialization (Article 4), dignity is
referred to subsequently in seven other articles. 94 Article 6 prohibits
"discrimination based on genetic characteristics" which infringe human
dignity 95; Article 10 forbids research on the human genome which fails
to respect human dignity, and other practices (e.g., human cloning)
"contrary to human dignity" (Article 11)96; "advances in biology, genetics
and medicine" are to be made available to all "with due regard for the
dignity . . . of each individual" (Article 12)97; a framework for free
genomic research is to be provided in a way which safeguards
"respect... for human dignity" (Article 15) and thereby raises
awareness of "responsibilities regarding the fundamental issues relating
to the defense of human dignity" that arises from human genetic
research (Article 21).98 In Article 24, the International Bioethics
Committee is mandated to provide oversight "regarding the
identification of practices that could be contrary to human dignity" (e.g.,
90. F. William Dommel & Duane Alexander, The Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 259 passim
(1997).
91. U.N. Educ. Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Comm. of Governmental
Experts for the Finalization of a Declaration of the Human Genome, Final Report, 13,
BIO-97/CONF.201/9 (July 22-25, 1997).
92. Beyleveld & Brownsword, supra note 88, at 664-65.
93. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, UNESCO,
29th Sess., 29C/Resolution 19, arts. 2(a)-(b) (Nov. 11, 1997).
94. Beyleveld & Brownsword, supra note 88, at 664-65.
95. Id. at 665.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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germline interventions). 99 Essentially, then, the Declaration seeks to
but establish a legal framework for international research. 10 0
B. A New Bioethics Instrument
UNESCO's continuing effort to give both substantive and practical
value to the basic principles of bioethics as lynchpins for safeguarding
advances in genetic science is seen in its present study of the need for
and development of a Universal Instrument in Bioethics.' 10 The
Instrument, when completed, will encourage all member states of the
United Nations "to set up national and regional bodies designed to
encourage the population to take part in an informed debate" on genomic
and other scientific fields. It will, furthermore, allow all citizens to
receive clear and precise information on the impact of the procedures
available to them; this will, in turn, enable citizens to give truly full and
informed consent to either accept or to decline such procedures.
10 2
C. The Draft Declaration
On January 28, 2005, UNESCO's International Bioethics
Committee finalized its Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal
Norms on Bioethics. 10 3 In declaring its aim to provide a framework for
setting forth universal principles and procedures to assist states in
developing legislation and policies in bioethics, 0 4 the Draft Declaration
seeks, specifically, to "promote equitable access to medical, scientific and
99. Id.
100. BARUCH A. BRODY, THE ETHICS OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 89 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1998); see also Michael D. Kirby, Challenges of the Genome, 20 U. NEW SO. WALES
L. J. 537, 548-49 (1997).
101. U.N. Educ. Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Working Group of the IBC
on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics, Preliminary
Report on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics, 6-10,
SHS/EST/02/CIB-9/5 (Nov. 15, 2002).
102. Id. at 33; see also Steering Committee on Bioethics, Draft Additional
Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on Biomedical Research,
pmbl., CDBI/INF (2001) 5 (July 18, 2001) (explaining goal of providing protections on
human experimentations). See generally, Allyn L. Taylor, Globalization and
Biotechnology: UNESCO and an International Strategy to Advance Human Rights and
Public Health, 25 AM. J. LAW & MED. 479, 507-08 (1999).
103. Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics,
SHS/EST/CIB-EXTR/05/CONF.202/2, (Feb. 9, 2005). Interestingly, the Committee-
differing with the style of the U.N. charge to it-has recommended the document be
entitled, "Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights." Id. On October 19,
2005, UNESCO's member states adopted the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and
Human Rights by acclamation. Press Release, UNESCO, UNESCO's General
Conference adopts Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (Oct. 19,
2005), available at http://tinyurl.com/do886.
104. Id. art. 3 (i).
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technological developments" 10 5 consistent with safeguarding respect for
human dignity and protecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms. 106
Enunciating a Principle of Social Responsibility codified in
Article 13, the Declaration directs decisions and practice in science and
technology to advance "the common good" by providing "access to quality
of health care and essential medicines, 10 7 providing "access to adequate
nutrition and water,"10 8 improving living conditions, 10 9 eliminating the
marginalization of persons,11 0 and reducing poverty and illiteracy.11 1
Building on this delineation of social responsibility, Article 14 directs the
benefits of scientific research to advance, among other interests, "access
to quality health care,"112 "facilities for new treatments or medical
products," 113 and "support for health services. '114
Finally, again underscoring the responsibility of the state to
promote and safeguard public health standards, Article 22 of the Draft
Declaration urges that proportionate measures designed to accord
respect for "human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms" be
undertaken when there are "threats of serious or irreversible damage to
public health or human welfare." 115 In this regard, the Declaration is to
be seen as a bold effort to recognize-and thereby validate-the
inextricable relationship between human dignity and human rights with
"access to health care."'116 Once adopted by the U.N. General Assembly,
the Declaration will serve as an important guide for the global
development of health care policy which, in turn, will advance a claim to
a universal right to health.
D. The Scope of Human Dignity
Human dignity, as a concept, is open to abuse and
misinterpretation. It can not only oversimplify complex issues, but can
also encourage a form of paternalism totally incompatible with the very
spirit of self-determination. 117 Often it is seen as the primary source of
human rights. While, at other times, it is viewed as but a species of it or
a framework for defining the subject of human rights. Still, in other
105. Id. art. 3 (v).
106. Id. art. 3 (iii).
107. Id. art. 13 (i).
108. Id. art. 13 (ii).
109. Id. art. 13 (iii).
110. Id. art. (iv).
111. Id. art. 13 (v).
112. Id. art. 14 (ii).
113. Id. art. 14 (iii).
114. Id. art. 14 (iv).
115. Id. art. (b).
116. Id. art. (ii).
117. Beyleveld & Brownsword, supra note 88, at 662.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BIOETHICS
applications, human dignity defines objects to be protected; thus, in some
situations it may limit individual rights of autonomy and self-respect.
118
It has been asserted that "any violation of human rights implicitly
violates human dignity."11
9
Dignity may also be thought of as a claim for a basic degree of
respect as individual human beings, and is accordingly a driving or
defining force in shaping well-being. 120 As such a mechanism for action,
it may be understood further "as that which protects self-respect, which
in turn permits self-consciousness and self-identity, which, in turn,
requires the promulgation of rights.' '12 1 Always at the crux of defining
and advancing human well-being, however, are health and human
rights. 122
V. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, OR HEALTH PROTECTION
As early as the fourth century B.C., Aristotle reportedly wrote of a
citizen's absolute right to the measure of good health that society is able
to give. 123 Over the course of time, the notion of a right to health, or
health care as a human right, has gained some level of credence; the
right to health is sometimes considered as a corollary to the general duty
and responsibility of states to advance the enjoyment of freedoms and
entitlements considered as the rights of each human. 124 Yet the battle
for universal recognition and enforcement of human rights has been
largely aspirational and unenforceable. 125 That said, an interesting
perspective in law reform, led by a prominent Australian jurist, is
nonetheless beginning to take hold.
118. Id. at 665. For an extended analysis of human dignity as a duty-led or
rights-led concept, see id. at 667-73.
119. Id. at 665.
120. MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 10,
146 (Yale Univ. Press 1980).
121. Alice Ely Yamin, Defining Questions: Situating Issues of Power in the
Formulation of a Right to Health Under International Law, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 398, 401
(1996).
122. Jonathan M. Mann et al., Health and Human Rights, 1 HEALTH & HUM. RTS.
7, 19 (1994). Individual conscience is seen, interestingly, as an emerging norm in the
international law of human rights. ROBERT F. DRINAN, CAN GOD AND CAESAR COEXIST?:
BALANCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (Yale Univ. Press 2004).
123. EUGENE B. BRODY, BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (1993).
See generally Steven D. Jamar, The International Right to Health, 22 S.U.L. REV. 1
(1994) (stating that "even before the time of Aristotle the centrality of health has been
recognized").
124. BRODY, supra note 123, at 13.
125. GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE AND THE MARKET 256
(1998).
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In the Fifty-fifth Hamlyn Lecture, Justice Michael D. Kirby of the
High Court of Australia, observed that the trend toward globalism
dictates that human rights law, as a part of the larger body of
international legal principle, be used to fill gaps in the common law
decisionmaking process or when ambiguities in written law need to be
resolved. 126 Indeed, "as national and international determinations come
to influence courts in many lands, global sources will supplement purely
local ones in judicial reasoning, especially when the judge is faced by a
novel problem."'12 7 Contemporary constitutional interpretation requires
more reference to international law and normative values in order to
avoid intellectual isolation by the judiciary. 128 The extent to which there
is an active or passive interaction between international law and
national law remains an issue of great importance. 129
A. Definitional Uncertainties
Defining and enforcing civil and political rights in the world
community has required, and continues to require, tenacity and great
patience. The record of achievement has, at best, been quite irregular.
An even greater challenge lies in shaping a meaningful, identifiable,
operational, and enforceable right to health within the ambit of economic
and social rights.
To make a right to health more than merely aspirational, a first
step is to develop a workable definition of what precisely such a right
includes. What, for example, does "enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health"'130 mean, as used in the preamble of the WHO's 1946
Constitution? Article 55 of the U.N. Charter dedicated the United
Nations to promoting solutions for international health problems. 131
What is the nature and scope of these problems? The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights structures a right to enjoy "a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family."'1 32 What are the requisites of health necessary for a state of
126. MICHAEL KIRBY, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: AUTHORITY, PRINCIPLE AND POLICY IN
THE JUDICIAL METHOD 74 (2004).
127. Id. at 75.
128. Justice Michael Kirby, The Seventh Annual Grotius Lecture: The Growing
Use of International Human Rights Law in the Elaboration of Municipal Constitutions,
The American Society of International Law, 99th Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C.
(March 30, 2005).
129. NOWAK, supra note 38, at 52-53.
130. World Health Organization, pmbl., para. 3, July 22, 1946.
131. U.N. Charter art. 55(b).
132. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess. at 71, U.N. doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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well-being? 133 Interestingly, the ICESCR does not define the right to
health and treats it in general, rather than in specific, terms.
134
Some rights within the ICESCR are "recognized,"'1 35 while others
need only be "respected,"136 "ensured,"137 or "guaranteed."138  The
highest ordering of state responsibility under the ICESCR, then, is found
under the terms, "to ensure" and "to guarantee"; for they are not subject
to the standard of "progressive realisation."'139 While the right to the
highest standard of health is only "recognized," this was done in the
drafting of the ICESCR to assure wider acceptability to states initially
unwilling to assume specific responsibilities-it is, however, given a
stronger ordering by the enumeration of various, non-exhaustive steps
for its realization. 140
In actuality, a fundamental right to health suggests something that
usually cannot be guaranteed at all-namely, perfect health. Not only
does this state or condition vary from person to person, but from country
to country, and is thus truly an indeterminate variable.141 In the
relevant international human rights instruments pertinent to shaping a
right to health, 142 the right is viewed as corresponding to a shorthand
term for "the right to the highest attainable standard of health, '143 with
the right to health care viewed as an inherent part of the right to
133. See GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 82, at 27-31 (noting that although
several documents promote the right to public health, few, if any, have a working
definition or standard).
134. Id.; see PAUL SIEGHART, THE LAWFUL RIGHTS OF MANKIND 130 (1985)
(acknowledging the European Social Charter (Art. 11), and the African Charter, (Art.
16), also recognize the rights of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest or best
attainable standard of health-both physical and mental). See also Organization of
African Unity: Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Jan. 7, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58
(recognizing the right to public health without providing a definition or explanation of
what such a right entails); see generally M.C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 24 (1995) (discussing international
agreement on human rights without explicitly defining the right to health).
135. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), at 49, 21 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Jan. 3, 1976).
136. See e.g., id. art. 13(3), 15(3) (requiring respect for parental liberty regarding
certain aspects of their children's education and freedom of scientific research).
137. See e.g., id. art. 3, 8 ("ensuring" the equal rights of men and women as well
as trade union rights).
138. See e.g., id. art. 2(2), 7(a)(1) ("guaranteeing" nondiscrimination and the
prohibition of gender discrimination in employment).
139. TOEBES, supra note 33, at 293.
140. Id. at 293-332.
141. Id. at 16; see also Symonides, supra note 36, at 132-35.
142. See TOEBES, supra note 33, at 28 (listing the WHO Constitution, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child as
international instruments pertaining to a right to health).
143. Id. at 17-18.
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health. 144 Care must always be taken to avoid broadening the scope of
this right to include "almost everything."1 45
There is agreement, however, that there are basic underlying
preconditions which influence health and indeed become part of this
right to health. They include: adequate nutrition, safe drinking water,
sanitation, safe working conditions or occupational health, and a healthy
environment. 146 Without doubt, many of these preconditions overlap
with the Covenant for Economic and Cultural Rights. 147  They
complement and strengthen what has been termed "core health care
elements" such as safeguarding maternal and child health care
(including family planning), immunizing against major infectious
diseases, and the appropriate treatment of common diseases and
injuries.148
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights mandates
equitable access to health care of appropriate quality. 14 9 This, of course,
does not resolve in any manner the defining issue of what form of health
care is accessible and appropriate. 150 Nor does this mandate allow for
any recognition of the fact that the strength and availability of health
care services depend not only upon the resource bases available to those
within domestic health care systems, 151 but the social settings in which
health demands arise.152 Consequently, individual claims to appropriate
health care are often seen as incompatible with communitarian
obligations to preserve the general good. 15 3
Thus, the Universal Declaration, together with the ICESCR and the
ICCPR, can be understood as, at best, referencing the right to health as
an "imperfect obligation."'154 And under the principle of cultural
relativism, serious doubts remain as to whether all of the rights in the
Declaration are encoded culturally in one context or are subject to
144. Id. at 19.
145. Id. at 259; see DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH:
MATERIALS ON AND ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL JURISPRUDENCE 302-09 (2005) (explaining that
the right to health is essentially seen as the right of access to health services).
146. TOEBES, supra note 33, at 122, 272; NOVAK, supra note 37, at 143 (arguing
that the right to health, as a social human right to health, is linked, perhaps
inextricably, to the right to an adequate standard of living and right to food).
147. TOEBES, supra note 33, at 122, 272.
148. Id. at 284.
149. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 65, art. 3; See
JAMES E. CHILDRESS, PRACTICAL REASONING IN BIOETHICS 249-50 (Indiana Univ. Press
1997) (arguing for equitable access to health care).
150. Dieter Giesen, Health Care as a Right: Some Practical Implications, 13 INT.
L J. MED. & L. 285, 290 (1994); see generally ROBERT M. VEATCH ET AL, MEDICAL
ETHICS 57-73 (Robert M. Veatch ed., 2d ed. 1994) (discussing the concepts of health,
illness, and disease).
151. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH?
417 (1997).
152. ANNAS, supra note 125, at 254.
153. BRODY, supra note 123, at 29.
154. Kirby, supra note 8, at 20.
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differing applications within the varying world cultures, especially since
notions of right and wrong vary across transnational boundaries. 15
5
B. Shaping A Right To Health Care
Because of these profound uncertainties, it has been suggested that
it is misleading to refer to a governmental obligation to guarantee a
person's good health. 156 Rather, it is better and more accurate to refer to
a right to health protection 15 7 which would include a right to health care
and a right to live under healthy conditions. 158 Yet a strong conceptual
framework for both identifying and analyzing those essential societal
factors representing the conditions under which people can be healthy is
lacking. 159 Others suggest that a right to health does exist in the
abstract but disagree as to the practical consequences of its
recognition. 160 Consistent with all of these concerns, the WHO recently
concluded that it made poor economic sense to provide comprehensive
medical services for everyone. Accordingly, poorer countries should be
helped to carry out low cost programs to tackle illnesses such as malaria,
while wealthier countries should learn how to prioritize the care they
offer. Again, the components of qualitative health care availability are
seen as being shaped by a clear understanding of resource availability
within each state. 161
155. Id. at 8; STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 31, at 192-94; VINCENT, supra note
66, at 37-38.
156. But see CHILDRESS, supra note 149, at 241 (arguing for a political-legal right
to health care).
157. Virginia Leary, Health, Human Rights and International Law, 82 AM. SOCY.
INT'L. L. PROC. 122 (1988).
158. Virginia Leary, The Right to Health in International Human Rights Law, 1
HEALTH & Hum. RTS. 25, 31 (1994). See generally Eleanor D. Kinney & Brian Alexander
Clark, Provisions for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of the Countries of the
World, 37 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 285, 291, 305-59 (2004) (suggesting 67.5% of the world
constitutions have provisions covering health or health care and then surveying them).
159. Jonathan M. Mann, Medicine and Public Health, Ethics and Human Rights,
37 HASTINGS CENTER RPT. 6, 8 (1997); NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE 883 (2002) (asserting that the right to health is seen as embodying both
freedoms and entitlements: freedom to the control of one's health and body together
with the right to be free from interference with medical treatment and an entitlement to
participation in a system of health protection which affords all individuals under it a
right to attain the highest levels of health).
160. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENT 201
(Ralph Beddard & Dilys M. Hill eds., 1992).
161. Ian Murray, World Body Calls for Healthcare to be Rationed, THE TIMES
(London), May 12, 1999, at 2.
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C. The ESCR Comment
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ESCR), which is charged with monitoring the implementation of
ICESCR, issued in 2000 General Comment No. 14: "The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health."16 2 While proclaiming health as
"a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other
human rights," the ESCR structures the right within broad norms, state
obligations, violations, and implementations.
163
There are four core state obligations, among others, designed to
guarantee a minimal level of health: nondiscriminatory access to health
services, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups; adequate food
sources that are nutritionally enriched; basic shelter which
accommodates sanitation and potable water; and use of essential
drugs. 164 The development of national public health strategies that
address health concerns regarding reproduction and maternal health,
immunization, infectious disease control, and ready access to health
information is centrally important. 16 5
While impressive, the General Comment must surely have been
seen as more aspirational than determinative, for the indisputable fact
remains: violatons of these lofty (albeit noble) pronouncements of state
obligations remain nonjusticiable. Also, the bottom line may be that the
members of the transnational community-by and large-simply refuse
to invest the necessary economic capital sufficient to guarantee the
components of the right to health as seen by the ESCR. Enforcement of
such broadly defined and indeterminate rights is not viewed as practical.
Since the United States has not ratified the ICESCR, as observed
above, the General Comment has neither force nor effect on its
international responsibilities. In point of fact, the United States may be
seen as violating the right to health, not because it spends too little on
health care and public health, but rather because its resources are
distributed inequitably. 166
162. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 22 Sess., Agenda Item
3, U.N. Doc. E/C.1212000/4, 4 (2000), available at http://www.unhchr.chltbs/doc.nsf/
(symbol)/E.C. 12.2000.4. En?Opendocument.
163. Id.; DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES 188
(1989) (noting that Art. 12 (2) of the International Covenant is far too general to provide
clear insight into concrete actions states parties need to take in order to be in
compliance); see also Meier, supra note 65, at 156 (observing that little guidance is
provided to the states regarding the scope of their obligations under the right to health
under the ESCR).
164. JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note 159, at 96-97.
165. Id.
166. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Human Right to Health: A Right to the Highest
Attainable Health, 31 HASTINGS CENTER RPT. 29,30 (2001); See Eleanor D. Kinney, The
International Human Right to Health: What Does This Mean for Our Nation and
World?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1457 (2001) (noting that the WHO ranked performance of the
U.S. health care system 37th among all nations due to disparities by race and income);
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VI. INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES?
For any working definition of a right to health, health care, or
health protection to have contemporary relevance, it must first include
recognition of an obligation of the state "to ensure the conditions
necessary for the health of individuals."'1 67 As observed previously, there
is no consensus on what minimal conditions are necessary for health
168
because of the almost inextricable relation its recognition as a perfect or
imperfect right has with the level of cultural and economic development
of each state within the world community.169 Inevitably, individual
claims to health right protections must be balanced within a utilitarian
construct against societal or communal needs. 170 The result often means
that equity is forsaken for economic stability.
Organizationally, at the supranational level of administration, the
internal weaknesses of the U.N. Security Council and the International
Court of Justice for enforcing violations of human rights are compounded
"in specific health policies" by the WHO's inability to assume a decisive
leadership role. Indeed, the WHO has been reluctant to utilize its legal
powers-or to adopt legal principles-which implement directly health
care strategies. It has chosen instead to adopt a functional or technical
approach to health care matters, thereby developing a well-regarded and
limited reputation for the collection of data and for technical
standardization of international health regulations.
171
Consequently, recommendations, resolutions, codes of conduct, and
technical standards comprise the arsenal used by the WHO to impact
health issues transnationally. 172 Whether this is viewed as an effective,
systematic, and assertive approach to problem-solving is questionable.
Absent use of the treaty-making process, however, it is feared the
leadership ability of the WHO and other international organizations will
see generally Ronald Dworkin, Justice in The Distribution of Health Care, 38 MCGILLL.
J. 883 (1993) (arguing that the right to health requires equitable distribution of health
care).
167. GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 82, at 29.
168. Mann, supra note 159 at 6, 8.
169. Kirby, supra note 8, at 8.
170. GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 82, at 4, 33-34; BRODY, supra note 123, at
202; HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 54-55 (Jonathan M. Mann et al., eds. 1999).
171. Alison Lakin, The Legal Powers of the World Health Organization, 3 MED. L.
INT'L. 23, 24 (1997); see Jamar, supra note 123, at 43-48; See also Yutaka Arai-
Takahashi, The Role of International Health and the WHO in the Regulation of Public
Health, in LAW AND THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF HEALTH 139-41 (Robyn Martin & Linda
Johnson eds., 2001) (discussing ways to induce compliance with WHO directives); see
generally Elsa Stamatopoulou, The Development of United Nation's Mechanisms for the
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687 (1998)
(discussing the development of U.N. human rights protection mechanisms and outlining
some of the main challenges in effectuating human rights).
172. Lakin, note 169, at 24, 33-4.
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remain limited, due inherently to the continuing domination of
independent states.1 73
Regardless of which approach is taken to resolving the complex
definitional issues of human rights and their scope, there is an
overriding need for more explicit implementation standards to be
articulated and developed in order to reflect the dynamic quality of a
contemporary human rights doctrine. 174 The very imprecision in
problems of definition as well as measurement, monitoring, and
enforcement have been roadblocks to applying useful economic, social,
and cultural rights. Indeed, some consider them insuperable
obstacles. 175 Until all countries ratify the ICESCR, establish the
domestic capability to monitor the successful enjoyment of these
covenant rights and create a complaint and investigative process when
allegations of human rights violations occur, no resounding progress or
success will be recorded. 176
Concrete steps have been taken to address many of these concerns.
Central to this agenda for change has been the Eleventh Additional
Protocol to The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which has streamlined a new
complaint procedure for individual human rights complaints and
interstate complaint procedures for all state parties. 177 Also, the
Commission on Human Rights and other specialized agencies17 8 provide
a venue for individual human rights complaints. The current efforts of a
Working Group of the U.N. Human Rights Commission to study and
hopefully resolve the issue of whether human rights are universal and
should be enforced under one mechanism can have nothing but a
salutary effect on clarifying the issues of justiciability. 179
Whether justiciability of economic, social, cultural and health rights
is achieved (as it has been for civil and political rights 8 0 ) in the future,
depends in very large measure upon the willingness of the courts to
recognize and apply them. Perhaps equally as important is whether
states achieve a demonstrable level of economic prosperity that
accommodates a recognition and a guarantee of these rights. 8 1 Even
though there is a discernible trend toward such a recognition, 18 2 the fact
remains that without a sustained level of economic stability,
justiciability will not be validated for claims to either a right to health,
173. Id.
174. GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 82, at 35.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See NOWAK, supra note 38, at 164 (discussing the streamlined procedures to
facilitate international human rights adjudication).
178. See Dennis & Stewart, supra note 55, at 502-03.
179. Id. at 504.
180. TOEBES, supra note 33, at 231-32, 345.
181. Id. at 349; see also Symonides, supra note 36, at ch. 3.
182. TOEBES, supra note 33, at 349.
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health care, or health protection. It should be remembered that Article
2(1) of the ICESCR allows the realization of rights set out within it by
the state signatories "progressively" and "to the maximum of a State's
available resources." Thus, this principle of progressive realization has
the very real effect of emasculating any concerted and sustained attempt
to structure a universal right to health; the justifiable differences among
states (timely or otherwise) in this area of concern are based upon their
varying respective degrees of political will and levels of economic
resources.1 8 3 So long as their compliance efforts move "progressively"
toward the goal of realizing the Article 12 right to health, no violations
are registered. 1 8
4
Perhaps the self-defeating weakness of the whole enforcement
structure is its reliance upon a voluntary system of compliance and self-
policing efforts by individual states. Inevitably, self-interest shapes and
controls the ultimate response to a violation of human rights as well as
health care protections which are an inherent part of those basic
rights. 8 5
183. Meier, supra note 65, at 159.
184. Id.
185. GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 82, at 8-9; see TIMOTHY S. JOST, READINGS
IN COMPARATIVE HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS 5 (2001) (noting that the WHO has no
authority to enforce compliance); see generally Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International
Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999) (discussing the problems of
compliance in international law).
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